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Perfect Adherence or Material
Deviation?: The Eleventh Circuit's
Bright IDEA in Resolving
Individualized Education Plan
Implementation Cases*
by Chelsea Henderson
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002, L.J., a child with intellectual disabilities and autism, began
using an individualized education plan (IEP). 1 This IEP was meant to
provide L.J. with the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that is
guaranteed to all children across the United States. However, L.J.'s
mother did not believe the School Board of Broward County adequately
implemented L.J.'s IEP.2 L.J.'s mother's concern resulted in an almost
twenty-year legal battle between L.J. and the Broward County School
Board.3 This battle finally ended in June 2019, when the United States

* The University of Alabama at Birmingham (B.S., cum laude, 2017); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2020). Member, Mercer Law Review
(2019-2020). The author would like to thank Associate Dean Linda Jellum for her
guidance and support in writing this casenote.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2020) (defining "individualized education plan"); L.J. v. Sch.
Bd. of Broward Cty., 927 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019).
2. Parents can make two different legal challenges to their child's IEP: content
challenges and implementation challenges. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1207. The Supreme Court of
the United States has determined the proper standard for IEP content challenges already.
See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203–04
(1982); Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S.Ct. 988, 998–99 (2017). However, the
Court has yet to determine the proper standard for implementing a child's IEP. L.J., 927
F.3d at 1207. As a result, the circuit courts must determine what standard to use in IEP
implementation cases.
3. Id. at 1206.
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Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit joined four other circuits 4 in
holding that the proper standard in determining whether a child's IEP
is being adequately implemented is the "material deviation" standard. 5
Congress recognized the right to a FAPE in the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 6 Known today as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 7 FAPEs are guaranteed to all
intellectually disabled children across the country through the use of
IEPs.8 Generally, parents can make two different legal challenges to
their child's IEP: content challenges and implementation challenges. 9
The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed IEP content
challenges in a number of cases.10 However, the Court has yet to
determine the proper standard for implementing a child's IEP. 11 As a
result, the circuit courts have been left to determine what standard to
use in IEP implementation cases.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, L.J., has a speech-language impairment and autism.
He attended Broward County public schools from kindergarten to
middle school, with periods of home-schooling intermixed. During L.J.'s
third-grade year, staff at L.J.'s elementary school worked with L.J.'s
mother to create an IEP. This IEP followed L.J. through elementary
school, but once L.J. began sixth-grade, the school board proposed a
change in L.J.'s IEP. School professionals on L.J.'s IEP Team wanted to
update his IEP to accommodate the new middle-school environment.
Meanwhile, L.J. displayed disruptive behavior, including refusing to
attend school. When L.J. refused to attend school, his mother chose to
home-school him.12
L.J. returned to school in the seventh grade, but his attendance
issues remained. In all, L.J. missed over 100 days of school due to his
refusal to attend class and his multiple illnesses. Not only did L.J. miss
4. See generally Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007);
Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2000); Sumter Cty. Sch.
Dist. 17 v. Heffernan, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011); A.P. v. Woodstock Bd. of Educ., 370
Fed.Appx. 202 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished).
5. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1207.
6. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat
773.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2020).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
9. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1207.
10. See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. 176; Endrew F., 137 S.Ct. 988.
11. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1207.
12. Id. at 1207–08.
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approximately three-fourths of the school year, but when he did attend
school, L.J. either engaged in violent outbursts in the classroom or left
school early. Once L.J. was in his eighth-grade year, his mother once
again unenrolled him from school and began home-schooling L.J.13
During this tumultuous time for L.J. and the school, L.J.'s mother
began a lengthy legal battle with the Broward County School Board
spanning from 2002 to 2019.14 In 2007, L.J.'s mother filed a final
complaint against the Broward County School Board. In this complaint,
L.J.'s mother challenged the implementation of L.J.'s elementary school
IEP during the "stay-put" period. Although the ALJ had previously
found that the school had adequately implemented the elementary IEP,
L.J.'s mother claimed that the school failed to properly implement the
elementary IEP during her appeal to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida.15
It is this last complaint that brings us to the current case. An ALJ
heard the new complaint during eighteen hearings that spanned two
years.16 This ALJ found that the school had not adequately
implemented the elementary school's IEP during L.J.'s seventh- and
eighth-grade years—the years when L.J.'s mother appealed the first
ALJ's decision to the district court. After the ALJ sided with L.J., both
L.J.'s mother and the school filed separate complaints in the district
court.17 L.J.'s mother asked the court to enforce the ALJ's order, along

13. Id. at 1208–09.
14. Almost as soon as L.J.'s IEP was implemented in 2002, L.J.'s mother challenged
the IEP and requested due process hearings under 20 U.S.C. § 1414. Then, when L.J.
entered sixth grade, and the school wanted to update L.J.'s IEP. L.J.'s mother filed an
IDEA complaint challenging the content of this new IEP. Next she then invoked IDEA's
"stay-put" provision. The "stay-put" provision requires the continued implementation of
an older IEP during the challenge of the new IEP. Thus, L.J.'s mother's request to invoke
the "stay-put" provision required the middle school to continue providing L.J.'s
elementary school IEP rather than the updated IEP Broward County school board wanted
to implement. Id. at 1208.
In addition, L.J.'s mother filed multiple other complaints, all of which alleged the middle
school IEP was inadequate compared to the elementary IEP. Eventually, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consolidated five of her complaints, along with one of the
school's complaints, and held hearings over eight months. After the hearings concluded,
the ALJ found that the school appropriately implemented the elementary IEP during the
"stay-put" period. Consequently, L.J.'s mother appealed the ALJ's decision to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. That court affirmed the ALJ's
findings and order. Id. at 1208–09.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1209. The time span ranged from March 2007 to October 2009.
17. Id.
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with additional relief,18 while the school challenged the ALJ's findings
and order. After filing these complaints, both parties cross-moved for
judgment on the administrative record.19
Instead of ruling on the motions, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida issued an order requiring both parties
to supply supplemental briefing, thus deferring any decision on the
merits of both the school and L.J.'s complaints. 20 As a result, the ALJ
ordered both parties to brief the applicable standard of review for IEP
implementation cases.21 Five years after the supplemental briefing was
filed,22 the district court reversed the ALJ's decision and entered
judgment in favor of the school, finding that, under the materiality
standard, the school did not fail to implement L.J.'s IEP during the
"stay-put" period.23 L.J.'s mother then appealed the district court's
decision to the Eleventh Circuit. 24 The issue for the Eleventh Circuit
was whether the school's implementation of L.J.'s elementary school
IEP during L.J.'s seventh- and eighth-grade school years was adequate
according to the IDEA.25
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Life Before IDEA
Before enacting the IDEA in 1975, Congress passed multiple laws to
address how the public education system should or would provide
services to intellectually disabled students. 26 Then, in 1965, Congress
passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 27 and the State
18. L.J. also asked to be compensated for attorneys' fees and damages. Complaint for
Injunctive Relief, Damages, and Attorneys' Fees, 2011 WL 9198548, 6 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
19. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1209. Judgment on the administrative record is akin to the
summary judgment process. G.J. v. Muscogee Ct. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 1258, 1267–68 (11th
Cir. 2012).
20. L.J., 927 F.2d at 1209.
21. Id. See L.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 850 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1325–26 (S.D. Fla.
2012).
22. There is no reasoning stated in the record that explains why five years passed
between the first order in 2012 to the decision in 2017.
23. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1209. See L.J. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 2017 WL
6597516, 32 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
24. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1209.
25. Id.at 1209–10.
26. A few of these laws include the Training of Professional Personnel Act of 1959,
which helped train teachers and other education professionals on how to teach children
with intellectual disabilities. Next, the Teachers of the Deaf Act of 1961 helped train
teachers for children who were deaf or hard-of-hearing.
27. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, P.L. 89-10 (1965).
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Schools Act.28 Both provided states with grant assistance to help schools
educate children with disabilities; however, neither provided direct
federal funding for these special education services.
Years later, two lower court decisions proposed that children with
disabilities deserve an equal education compared to their typically
developing counterparts. The first was Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania.29 The plaintiffs (PARC) sued on
behalf of all intellectually disabled students "who [had] been denied
access to a free, public program of education and training" across
Pennsylvania school districts.30 According to PARC, the Pennsylvania
school districts failed to provide a free public education to all
intellectually disabled children.31 Both parties entered into a consent
agreement that gave all intellectually disabled students the right to free
educational programs and training.32
The other lower court case that addressed the education of children
with intellectual disabilities was Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia.33 Here, a civil action group sought a declaration
and an injunction on behalf of seven children to stop the District of
Columbia Public Schools from denying children with intellectual
disabilities a public education. 34 The court quoted Brown v. Board of
Education35 to emphasize the importance of an education. 36 The court
emphasized the following statement from Brown: "Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide [education], is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms."37 The court also pointed
out that the Supreme Court of the United States had found that the
28. State Schools Act, P.L. 89-313 (1965).
29. 334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In October 2010, President Obama passed
Rosa's Law, amending all federal law, including the IDEA, that referenced "mental
retardation" to instead use "having intellectual disabilities" along with other variations of
these phrases. P.L. 111-156, 124 Stat 2643. This change in language is in line with the
American Psychological Association's newest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders and the World Health Organization's International
Classification of Diseases. Intellectual Disability, AMERICAN SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.asha.org/PRPSpecificTopic.aspx?folderid=8589942540&section=Overview
(last visited March 31, 2020).
30. PARC, 334 F.Supp. at 1268.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1257–58.
33. 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
34. Id. at 868.
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Mills, 348 F.Supp. at 874–75.
37. Id. at 875 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
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denial of a public education is an "arbitrary deprivation of [students']
liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States]." 38 As such, the
court found that the Constitution of the United States required the
District of Columbia School Board to provide a free public education to
children with intellectual disabilities. 39 Both of these cases exhibited a
trend in protecting the right to education for children with disabilities.
B. The Birth of the IDEA and How It Works Today
From PARC and Mills's reasoning came the IDEA.40 After these
cases, Congress analyzed the education of children with disabilities
across the United States. After this Congressional investigation,
Congress enacted Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975.41 Congress included findings in the Act, which included that in
1975 there were more than "eight million handicapped children in the
United States . . ."42 Congress further found that the educational needs
of these eight million children were not being appropriately met,
showing that "more than half of the handicapped children . . . do not
receive appropriate educational services which would enable them to
have full equality of opportunity[.]" 43 Even more, at least one million of
these children with disabilities were completely excluded from the
public-school system.44 Congress further found that detecting
disabilities in schoolchildren and the training provided to educators was
ineffective.45
Today, the Act, known as IDEA, provides that "[d]isability is a
natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes the
right of individuals to participate in or contribute to society." 46 Two of

38. Id. at 875 (quoting Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (supplemental
opinion to Brown)).
39. Id. at 876.
40. S.R. No. 94-168, at 1430 (1975). According to the Senate Report, these two cases
mattered in the creation and enactment of IDEA.
41. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat
773.
42. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(b)(1),
89 Stat 773.
43. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142
§ 3(b)(2)-(3), 89 Stat 773.
44. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(b)(4),
89 Stat 773.
45. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(b)(5),
(7), 89 Stat 773.
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2020).
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the Act's main purposes are to ensure children with disabilities have
the right to a FAPE and to protect this right. 47 To protect the right to a
FAPE, the IDEA creates procedural safeguards including the right for
students and parents to file a complaint against the school challenging
"any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public
education to such child[.]"48 There are two questions in the current case:
What is a FAPE is and how should schools implement a FAPE? 49
According to the Act, a FAPE is:
[S]pecial education and related services that—(A) have been provided
at the public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section [1414(d) of this title].50

Although the FAPE itself is important, the implementation of a
FAPE is equally important, as shown in subsection (D). 51 Subsection (D)
involves IEPs.52 An IEP is "the centerpiece of the statute's education
delivery system for disabled children,"53 and is defined as "a written
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed,
and revised in accordance with section [1414(d) of this title]." 54
Together, educators and parents play a very significant role in
determining the appropriate IEP for a specific child.55
Section 141456 sets out the collaborative procedure involved in
creating an IEP. First, either a parent may request or an educational
agency may conduct a full individual evaluation to determine whether a
child has a disability.57 Next, IEPs are created according to statutory
guidelines.58 Then, there is the creation of an IEP Team once an IEP is

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)–(2) (2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (2020).
Id.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2020).
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06).
20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(c) (2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2020).
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in place.59 This team includes the child's parents, members of the
school, local agency, and where appropriate, the child with the
disability.60 The IEP Team decides what should and should not be in
the IEP and how to implement the IEP. Further, the IEP Team must
meet at least once a year to ensure the IEP is still achieving its goal. 61
The Act also provides safeguards to ensure schools follow all IDEA
procedures.62 Section 1415 guarantees parents their right to review
their child's records, to notice if the local educational agency intends to
initiate or refuse to initiate a change in the child's education, and to a
due process hearing over IEP issues. 63 This section also sets forth the
"stay-put" provision, which provides "during the pendency of any
proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, . . . the child shall
remain in the then-current educational placement . . ."64 All in all,
IDEA provides comprehensive procedures and guidelines for both
educational professionals and parents to ensure children with
disabilities receive their constitutionally guaranteed right to a FAPE.
The Act gives parents the power to sue if their child is not receiving
their FAPE.
IV. COURT'S RATIONALE
In L.J. v. School Board of Broward County, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court, holding that the school adequately
implemented L.J.'s IEP during his seventh- and eighth-grade school
years.65 Supporting the holding is the administrative posture of the
claim, statutory interpretation canons, and similar cases from
neighboring circuits.66
A. Standard for Reviewing an ALJ's Decision
When district courts review an ALJ's order, such as those orders
from IDEA cases, the district court must base its decision on a
preponderance of the evidence and must give the ALJ's conclusions
their "due weight[.]"67 When a court gives an ALJ's decision its "due
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2020).
60. Id.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)–(4) (2020).
62. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415.
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)–(7) (2020).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2020).
65. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1220.
66. See generally L.J., 927 F.3d at 1211–13.
67. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1210. (quoting R.L. v. Miami-Dade City Sch. Bd., 757 F.3d 1173,
1178 (11th Cir. 2014)).
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weight," the court must be cautious to ensure it does not "substitute its
judgment for that of the state educational authorities." 68 However,
giving an ALJs decision its "due weight" does not mean that a district
court must give the ALJ's decision blind deference.69 Instead, a district
court has the discretion to determine how much deference it will give to
the ALJ's conclusions of law.70
Then, when a federal appellate court reviews the district court's
decision, questions of law are reviewed de novo while findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error.71 However, where the district court was not
provided with additional evidence and the district court based its
decision on a "cold administrative record," the federal appellate court
"stand[s] in the same shoes as the district court" when reviewing the
administrative record.72 At this point, the federal appellate court can
either accept or reject ALJ findings.73
B. Interpreting the IDEA
Using these standards, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district
court's finding of law de novo and analyzed the statutory language.
First, the court looked to the text of the IDEA to find the ordinary
meaning of the words used.74 The relevant language is found in 20
U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D).75 This section provides: "Free appropriate public
education[.] The term 'free appropriate public education' means special
education and related services that— . . . (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required under section
[1414(d) of this title]."76 The specific language the court focused on is "in

68. Id. (quoting R.L., 757 F.3d at 1178).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting R.L., 757 F.3d at 1181).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1211–1212.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D). The court does not state how it finally ended up at 20
U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) to interpret the language. However, it seems that the operative
section of the statute that leads to the definitions section is 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), where
parents are given an opportunity to challenge an IEP "with respect to any matter relating
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of
a free appropriate public education to such child[.]" To understand what a "free
appropriate public education" is, one must see the definition, which takes one to 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(9)(D). Then, the application of statutory interpretation canons begins. LINDA D.
JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 80 (Russell L. Weaver ed., Carolina
Academic Press 2d. ed. 2013).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(D) (emphasis added).
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conformity with."77 The court explained that it must determine what it
means for a school to provide a FAPE to a child "in conformity with" an
IEP.78
The court focused heavily on the phrase "in conformity with" 79 to
determine how adequate IEP implementation must be: must it be
perfect or can it be materially sufficient? 80 Congress did not define the
phrase "in conformity with," so the court had to look to other sources of
meaning to determine the phrase's meaning. In doing so, the court first
looked at dictionary definitions, finding that "'[c]onformity' means
'[c]orrespondence in form, manner, or use; agreement; harmony;
congruity[,]'"81 and "the condition or fact of being in harmony or
agreement; correspondence; congruity; similarity[.]"82 Next, the court
looked to the Code of Federal Regulations, specifically 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.323(c)(2),83 which requires schools to provide an education "in
accordance with" IEPs.84 Additionally, the court noted "conspicuously
absent" words from the statute, such as "exact" or "identical." 85 The lack
of such specific words suggested that "IDEA recognizes . . . some degree
of flexibility is necessary in implementing a child's IEP[,]" and that
perfect IEP implementation is not appropriate. 86
Moving beyond the plain meaning canon, the court then considered
the statute in pari materia.87 In looking at another code section,
specifically 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), the court noted that the IDEA
recognizes that special education services are designed according to
each child's "unique needs."88 The court reasoned that as these "unique
needs" change, so does the IEP; 89 children develop quickly, meaning

77. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212.
78. Id.
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
80. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212.
81. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (6th ed. 1991)).
82. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 313 (5th ed. 2014)).
83. 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c)(2) (2020).
84. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(c)(2)). The reason Chevron
deference was not afforded to the C.F.R. is because this regulation does not interpret the
statute section the court is concerned with. In fact, neither the regulation nor the statute
interprets the phrase "in conformity with" in reference to the statute at hand, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(6). Thus, the C.F.R. regulation is simply being used as a guide.
85. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212.
86. Id.
87. Id. This method considers the whole act's context to help the court determine
what the language at issue means. JELLUM, supra note 73, at 127–29.
88. L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)).
89. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)).
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once adequate IEPs can shortly become inadequate.90 The court also
focused on the fact IEPs are reviewed at least once a year, 91 showing
that "IEPs have some amount of flex in their joints" with how schools
and parents must work together to ensure an IEP remains suitable. 92
While Congress did not define how to provide an IEP in conformity
with the Act, Congress did describe how to create an IEP. 93 The court
emphasized that an IEP is not a contract between the school, the
parents, and the child, but instead is merely "a written statement." 94
Thus, the court explained that using a standard that requires strict
compliance to a particular provision would contravene the idea that an
IEP is only a "plan."95 Moreover, the implementation of "stay-put" IEPs
is another telling contextual clue.96 Some implementation cases revolve
around implementing a "stay-put" IEP, such as the current case.97 As
such, perfect implementation of an older IEP "may quite literally be
impossible" considering new school settings. 98 The court recognized that
whatever standard it creates must also be able to accommodate old
IEPs, where "blind compliance" may not be realistic. 99 Thus, when
looking at the Act as a whole, the phrase "in conformity with" could not
equate to perfect implementation.100
C. Guidance from the Sister Circuits
Not only did the Eleventh Circuit apply traditional statutory
interpretation tools to determine meaning of the language in the section
and, thus, the correct standard for IEP implementation cases, but the
court also looked to what other circuits had done in similar cases.101 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the first
federal appellate court to determine a standard for IEP implementation
cases.102 The court held that the challenging party "must show more

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. (citing Cory D. v. Burke Cty. Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1299 (2002)).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414
L.J., 927 F.3d at 1212 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)).
Id. at 1213 (quoting Endrew, 137 S.Ct. at 999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1212–13.
Id. at n.6.
See generally Bobby R., 3000 F.3d 341.
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than a de minimus failure to implement all elements of [the] IEP[.]" 103
Instead, the challenging party must show that the school "failed to
implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP." 104 Then, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth, Second, and Fourth
Circuits also adopted this materiality standard. 105 Thus, four of eleven
circuits that have heard this question have adopted this material
failure standard, with the Eleventh Circuit following suit.
D. The Eleventh Circuit's Bright IDEA
After discerning the ordinary meaning of the statutory language,
considering the statue's context, and discussing the other circuits'
resolution of this issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the materiality
standard—asking whether a school has failed to implement substantial
or significant provisions of the child's IEP—is the appropriate test in a
failure-to-implement case."106 However, the court refused to delineate
specific steps school districts should take to better assist district courts
in applying this new standard.107 Instead, the court emphasized that
every child and every child's IEP are different, and the specific facts of
each case should be considered on a case-by-case basis.108 Although, the
court did provide broad guidelines for the lower courts. 109
First, the court stated that the "focus" in an implementation case
should be on "the proportion of services mandated to those actually
provided, viewed in context of the goal and import of the specific service
that was withheld."110 Reviewing courts must compare the services the
school actually delivered against the services outlined in the specific
IEP.111 To determine how much of the service was withheld and how
important those withheld services were in light of the IEP as a whole,
the courts must use a qualitative and quantitative approach.112
Second, a child's academic progress, or lack thereof, should be
considered.113 However, the court was swift in pointing out that a lack

103.
104.
105.
484.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 349.
Id.
Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821; A.P., 370 Fed. Appx. at 205; Heffernan, 642 F.3d at
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting L.J., 850 F.Supp.2d at 1320).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of academic progress is not dispositive. 114 Thus, a complaint cannot
merely state that a child is not progressing in their education and
expect the court to find an implementation failure. 115 Instead, if a
complaining party wishes to cite their child's lack of educational
progress as proof that the IEP is being implemented incorrectly, the
complaining party must show a connection between the lack of progress
and a specific implementation failure. 116
Additionally, the court held that "schools must be afforded some
measure of leeway" in determining whether a school should implement
a stay-put IEP.117 Given certain circumstances, it may not be fair to
judge a school based only on the effectiveness of a plan not meant to be
implemented in its new setting.118 The court pointed out this does not
give schools the unilateral decision-making power to determine whether
a "stay-put" IEP should remain in place, and instead, courts should look
at the context surrounding the implementation of the IEP.119 For
example, children who move from elementary school to middle school
may need different services, but are receiving an education under their
old IEP according to the "stay-put" provision may not be able to receive
the same exact educational experience that they once had simply based
on the child's development and the changing school environment.120
Finally, the IEP should be viewed as a whole, considering the IEP's
overarching goals.121 Reviewing courts "must consider the cumulative
impact of multiple implementation failures" instead of viewing each
implementation failure in isolation of the others.122 Although one failure
may not be enough to trigger the materiality standard, when put
together, multiple implementation failures can amount to an IDEA
violation.123 Because of the new materiality standard, Broward County
School Board prevailed against L.J. and his mother.124

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1215.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1220. First, the Eleventh Circuit claimed that the ALJ's conclusions lacked
support in the administrative record or failed to actually link supposed failures to a
provision in L.J.'s "stay-put" IEP. The court reasoned that the ALJ improperly blamed the
school for failing to implement certain curriculum recommendations although there was
no provision in the "stay-put" IEP requiring the school to adopt the recommendation. The
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E. Circuit Judge Jordan's Concurrence and Dissent
Circuit Judge Jordan concurred in part and dissented in part. 125
While Judge Jordan agreed with the materiality standard announced in
the opinion, he disagreed with the majority's phrasing of the new
standard and the announced outcome.126 Judge Jordan reasoned that
courts should be very careful with the words it chooses when creating
new common law.127 "Instead of asking 'whether a school has failed to
implement substantial or significant portions of the child's IEP,' [Judge
Jordan] would use the Ninth Circuit's formulation" created in Van
Duyn.128 Specifically, Judge Jordan prefers the language that "[a]
material failure occurs when there is more than a minor discrepancy
between the services a school provides to a disabled child and the
services required by the child's IEP."129 Judge Jordan recognized that
the difference in the language is "subtle," but he emphasized the

ALJ also improperly faulted the school for not understanding L.J.'s behavior issues
because the record indicated that the school did identify L.J.'s behavior problems. Put
simply, the "stay-put" IEP did not require the school to implement certain services, so the
school cannot be at fault for not implementing them. The court then explained its belief
that many alleged implementation failures were due to simple disagreements between
L.J.'s mother and the school about how to provide certain amenities. The court further
criticized the "stay-put" IEP as a whole, focusing on the fact that the "stay-put" IEP was
not meant for middle-school—it was meant to stay in elementary school. As such, the
court stated it should be "no surprise" that the "stay-put" IEP did not adequately address
some of L.J.'s problems because the IEP was forcibly outdated. Id. at 1216–17.
Additionally, the court faulted L.J. for the failure of many IEP services. The blame
stemmed from L.J.'s persistent absence from school. Although a child's absence from
school does not relive a school of its duties under IDEA, where a child's refusal to attend
school is not related to a failure to implement an IEP, the school cannot be faulted. Here,
L.J. claimed to have frequent illnesses along with a severe aversion to attending school
that began before the current case was brought. Moreover, the school offered L.J. support
in an effort to address is frequent absences. Thus, the court held that the school could not
be held accountable for L.J.'s persistent absence from school. Id. at 1217–19.
The court then addressed L.J.'s behavioral problems. The administrative record indicated
that the school created strategies to address future behavior based on observations of
L.J.'s past behavior. Also, the school's data collection forms were effective in finding the
information that surrounded L.J.'s behavioral issues. The IEP's broad language regarding
behavioral issues—"'[b]ehavior[al] needs' will be 'addressed through goals/objectives'" in
L.J.'s behavioral plan—supported the notion that the school's efforts did not constitute a
material failure. All in all, the school's implementation of L.J.'s "stay-put" IEP during
L.J.'s seventh- and eighth-grade school years was not a material failure. Id. at 1219–20.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1221.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821).
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difference is how the language tilts. 130 He would instead like the
language to "tilt[] slightly in favor of the child" because that is the
population IDEA protects.131
Moreover, Judge Jordan reasoned that this was not the right case to
use for formulating a new standard. 132 Judge Jordan pointed out that
this case has been in the court system since 2002, when the IEP in
question was first implemented.133 In 2002, L.J. was nine-years-old, and
by the time of the publication of the opinion, L.J. was twenty-six.134
Considering the time gap, Judge Jordan reasoned that the facts were
too unique to attempt to carve out a new standard based on them. 135 In
all, Judge Jordan dissented from the final holding of the case because
he believed that the school materially failed to implement L.J.'s "stayput" IEP.136 As such, Circuit Judge Jordan would have remanded to the
district court to determine the appropriate remedy.137
V. IMPLICATIONS
Although the Eleventh Circuit determined what standard lower
courts should use for IEP implementation issues, the court did not
clearly define how the standard should be applied in these cases. 138
Instead, the court explicitly stated that it would "not attempt to map
out every detail of this test," preferring that lower courts use a case-bycase fact analysis.139 Although the court's choice was no real surprise
considering the trend in adopting the materiality standard across
circuits,140 the court could have parsed out the standard more. With this
lack of clear guidelines, litigation over IEP implementation will
continue because a court will have to evaluate each student's IEP based
on its specific facts. This continued litigation means parents are still
unable to focus on educating their child with a disability, and schools
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1222. Although Judge Jordan recognized the issues L.J.'s incessant
absences caused, he nonetheless believed that the failure of the school to provide L.J.'s
mother with lesson and study plans at least seven days in advance of tests and
assignments was a material failure. Id. at 1222–23.
137. Id. at 1223.
138. See Id. at 1213–14.
139. Id. at 1214.
140. See Van Duyn, 502 F.3d at 821; A.P., 370 Fed. Appx. at 205; Heffernan, 642 F.3d
at 484.
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are still unable to know the limits of their obligations to their students
with disabilities.
While the courts have not yet crafted clear guidelines in addressing
IEP implementation issues, the United States Department of Education
(DOE) or Florida Department of Education could do so. The IDEA
grants the DOE the power to promulgate regulations to implement the
IDEA.141 The DOE has already promulgated unrelated regulations,
including one that guarantees that these regulations apply to states
that receive federal funding under the IDEA.142 Florida receives funding
under the IDEA, and to keep this funding, has enacted state statutes
and regulations to ensure compliance with the federal law. 143
Understanding how the federal and state statutes and regulations
work together is important in the statutory scheme. This importance
stems from the deference usually accorded to a federal agency's
interpretation of a federal statute it has been given the power to
administer. Known as Chevron144 deference, a federal court must defer
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a federal statute if Congress
has not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 145 Thus, here,
Congress has enacted no legislation to guide IEP implementations, the
DOE has the power to interpret the IDEA to guide schools in
implementing IEPs, and if reasonable, the DOE's reasonable
interpretation would be given Chevron deference.146
Unfortunately, the DOE has not put forth any reasonable
interpretation regarding IEP implementation, even though the DOE
was aware that IEP implementation has been an issue between parents
and schools since 2000.147 In the twenty years since the Fifth Circuit set
out a standard in IEP implementation cases, the DOE remained silent;
the phrase "in conformity with"148 has not been interpreted by rule or
even in a guidance document. As such, the important task of
determining the correct standard in implementing IEPs has been left to
the circuits. In leaving this important question up to the different
federal circuits, the agencies leave open the opportunity for the
inconsistent application of federal law. There are two options at this
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2020).
142. 34 C.F.R.§ 300.2 (2020).
143. See FLA. STAT. §§ 1003.571, 1003.5715 (2020); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A6.03311 (2020).
144. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
145. Id. at 842–43.
146. See generally Id. at 842–45.
147. See generally Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341. This is the first circuit case to address IEP
implementation.
148. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
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point: (1) Congress could amend the act and define the language or (2)
the DOE could issue a regulation or guidance document interpreting
the relevant language in the act.
The first option—Congress codifying an interpretation— is the better
option of the two. If Congress were to codify an interpretation, all IEP
implementation cases could be resolved at Chevron step-one because
Congress would have "directly spoken to the precise question at
issue."149 The courts will defer to Congress and there will be fewer
questions about whether an IEP is being implemented correctly. This
codification would also ensure that the interpretation will not change
with every new administration considering amendments to statutes
have a much longer and more arduous procedure than compared to
agency rules. On the other hand, if the agency promulgates a regulation
interpreting the language at issue, "in conformity with" 150 in the IEP
implementation context, ALJs and lower courts are bound by the
agency's interpretation so long as it is reasonable." 151 However, this
option leaves open the possibility of a changing interpretation every
time a new administration comes into office.
While these options both address the overarching issue, these two
options both only relate to the federal government; neither consider
what would happen if the Florida Department of Education
promulgated rules or published guidance documents on IEP
implementation. However, how much deference a state agency's
interpretation of a federal statute should be given is up for debate. For
example, in the Fourth Circuit, the court held that a state agency
implementing a federal statute under congressional authorization
should be afforded deference because the state agency's regulation
followed the federal law and the court did not want to substitute its
reasoning where the state agency's interpretation was reasonable.152
Then, the First Circuit recognized that deference that should be
afforded to state agencies interpreting federal statutes it was charged
with enforcing.153 Finally, and more recently, the Ninth Circuit held
that a state agency should be afforded "some deference" because of its
expertise in the issue before the court.154 However, the Tenth Circuit
and Second Circuit have not afforded deference to state agencies when

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
Ritter v. Cecil Cty. Off. of Hous. and Cmty. Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 328 (4th Cir. 1994).
City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc'n Co., 532 F.3d 70, 94 (1st Cir. 2008).
Ariz. v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014).
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the issue was presented to the respective courts. 155 Thus, the Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits are left to
determine what deference should be given to a state agency's
interpretations of federal law.
In conclusion, until Congress or an agency interprets 20 U.S.C. §
1409, states and circuits are left to craft their own interpretations of
federal law. Because circuits are not bound by other circuits'
interpretations, there is the risk of inconsistent application of federal
law. An inconsistent application of this law has grave consequences for
children across the country. According to the IDEA, children are
guaranteed a FAPE, but depending on where a school is located in its
respective judicial circuit, a child in one circuit could be receiving a
much different FAPE than a child in another circuit. Additionally, with
Congress and the DOE not acting on this issue, parents and schools are
left with no real guidance. Parents of children with disabilities will be
left to spend money they do not have in litigation with schools over IEP
implementation. Conversely, schools will be guessing on how to
adequately implement students' IEPs in compliance with court's vague
standards, possibly wasting taxpayer dollars in litigation or incorrectly
educating students. In either instance, parents and schools would
benefit from Congress or the DOE stepping up and issuing clear
guidance once and for all.

155. AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. Colo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 879 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir.
1989); Bldg. Trades Emp'rs Educ. Ass'n v. McGowan, 311 F.3d 501, 507 (2nd Cir. 2002).

